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INTRODUCTION
Construing patent claims has been a daunting task for judges,
litigators, and competitors because of the ideological split between
Federal Circuit judges. Some Federal Circuit judges follow a
“specification-based approach” by relying on the written
description and the prosecution history to limit the scope of the
claims to what was disclosed. Other Federal Circuit judges follow
a “claim-based approach” by referring to dictionaries to determine
the ordinary meaning of a disputed claim term. This continuing
debate has prompted the Federal Circuit to grant a petition to
rehear en banc the case of Phillips v. AWH Corp.1
To appreciate the consequences of this decision, this Note
explores the advantages and disadvantages of the claim-based and
specification-based approaches. The Note emphasizes that courts
should not get distracted with determining a concretized meaning
of disputed claim words using dictionaries alone. “A word is not a
crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought
and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used.”2 Relying on
dictionaries alone encourages superficial claim construction with
1

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh’g en banc granted, 376
F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
2
Jennifer R. Johnson, Out of Context: Texas Digital, the Indefiniteness of Language,
and the Search for Ordinary Meaning, 44 IDEA 521, 532 (2004) (quoting Towne v.
Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)).
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inadequate technical understanding of the invention. By reviewing
the specification and the prosecution history with an eye to a
person skilled in the pertinent art, only then can a judge ascertain
the proper meaning of a claim term.3 But the question still lingers,
even past the Phillips en banc decision, on what constitutes an
improper narrowing of a claim caused by importing a limitation
from the specification into the claim, and what constitutes a proper
reading of a claim in light of the specification.
Part I of this Note presents the analytical framework of the
specification-based and claim-based approaches.4 It examines the
methods by which one can overcome the “heavy presumption” that
a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning. Part I
also points out that the Federal Circuit, in employing the claimbased approach, refused to narrow multiple dictionary definitions
based on a rising threshold, referred to in this Note as the
Suggestion Test.5 Part II explores the role of extrinsic evidence in
claim construction6 and Part III evaluates the Federal Circuit’s
controversial commingling of claim validity analysis with claim
construction.7
Finally, Part IV demonstrates how the two
approaches to claim construction conflict in Phillips v. AWH
Corp., and presents the eagerly anticipated en banc decision that
provided little guidance to the patent community.8
I. IDEOLOGY OF THE TWO APPROACHES TO
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
Since the inception of the Federal Circuit in 1982, the
underlying principles of claim construction have changed. In the
past, the Federal Circuit applied the “specification-based
approach” by relying on the context of a claim term used in the
written description and the prosecution history to determine its
3

See Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (“the patent disclosure serves to point away from the improper meanings and
toward the proper meaning.”).
4
See infra notes 9–219 and accompanying text
5
See infra notes 158–86 and accompanying text
6
See infra notes 220–41 and accompanying text
7
See infra notes 242–58 and accompanying text
8
See infra notes 259–345 and accompanying text
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meaning.9 However, today, some Federal Circuit judges prefer
dictionaries as the primary source for determining the ordinary
meaning of the claims.10 This disparity is due to the application of
the twin canons of claim construction: (1) “one may not read a
limitation into a claim from the written description”, but (2) “one
may look to the written description to define a term already in a
claim limitation, for a claim must be read in view of the
specification which it is a part.”11
These canons provide competing principles in claim
construction. While the first canon prohibits importing a limitation
from the specification into the claims, the second canon permits
defining a claim term based on what is disclosed in the
specification, which inevitably leads to importing the definition
from the specification into the claims.12 The Federal Circuit
recognized that “there is sometimes a fine line between reading a
claim in light of the specification, and reading a limitation into the
claim from the specification.”13 However, the court did not
explain to what extent its reading “in view of” the written
description constitutes importing a limitation into the claim.
Typically, proponents of the specification-based approach
characterize their narrow interpretation of claims as being “read in
light of the specification.”14 They justify their claim construction
by suggesting that “[c]laims are not interpreted in a vacuum, but
are part of . . . the specification.” 15 Conversely, proponents of the
claim-based approach interpret the claims broadly so that

9

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976–88 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc).
10
Texas Digital Sys. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
11
Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
12
See id.
13
Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
14
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh’g en banc
granted, 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
15
Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 810 F.2d 1113, 1116
(Fed. Cir. 1987)).
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limitations “are not to be read into the claim.”16 They emphasize
that “while . . .claims are to be interpreted in light of the
specification and with a view to ascertaining the invention, it does
not follow that limitations from the specification may be read into
the claims.”17 These diverging views in applying the twin canons
of claim construction have been the subject of debate for many
years.
A. Context As Primary Source Of Claim Construction
One of the early cases that applied the specification-based
approach was the Markman en banc decision.18 The patent was
directed to a dry-cleaning inventory-control system for tracking the
progress of clothing items.19 At issue was the meaning of the
claim term “inventory.”20 The patentee argued that inventory
meant articles of clothing or dollars, while the accused infringer
alleged that the claim term referred only to clothing.21
To determine the meaning of the disputed claim term, the
Federal Circuit considered three sources: the claims, the
specification, and the prosecution history.22 The court emphasized
that “[c]laims must be read in view of the specification, of which
they are a part.” 23 Further, the court explained that the written
16

Comark, 156 F.3d at 1186 (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
17
Id (quoting Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
18
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976–88 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc). Aside from applying the specification-based approach, the Federal Circuit
addressed whether claim interpretation is an issue of law or fact, which was ultimately
resolved by the Supreme Court. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S.
370, 388–89 (1996) (suggesting that claim construction is a “special occupation” that
requires “special training and practice,” and that judges are “more likely to be right, in
performing such a duty, than a jury can be expected to be.”). For the sake of
“uniformity,” the Supreme Court allocated all issues of claim construction to the court.
Id. at 390. See also Cyber Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1446, 1454–57 (Fed Cir.
1998) (en banc) (confirming that claim construction is a matter of law, that the Federal
Circuit reviews de novo on appeal).
19
Markman (en banc), 52 F.3d at 971.
20
Id. at 973.
21
Id. at 974–75.
22
Id. at 979–80. Collectively, these three sources (the claims, the specification, and the
prosecution history) are referred to as the intrinsic record.
23
Id at 979.
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description “may act as a sort of dictionary, which explains the
invention and may define terms used in the claims,”24 and that the
prosecution history should also be considered if it is in evidence.25
In addition to the intrinsic record, the Federal Circuit noted that
extrinsic evidence can “be used for the court’s understanding of the
patent, [and] not for the purpose of varying or contradicting the
terms of the claims.”26 It “may be helpful to explain scientific
principles, the meaning of technical terms, and terms of art that
appear in the patent and prosecution history.”27 The court
identified extrinsic evidence as “all evidence external to the patent
and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony,
dictionaries, and learned treatises.”28
Applying its analytical framework to the facts of the case, the
Federal Circuit concluded that the disputed claim term “inventory”
refers to articles of clothing.29 While the disputed claim term
could mean cash or money, the court focused on the context in
which the term was used in the claim, the specification, and the
prosecution history.30 The court noted that the specification “is
pervasive in using the term ‘inventory’ to consist of ‘articles of
clothing’” and that the prosecution history supported its claim
construction.31
In another Federal Circuit opinion, the court applied the
specification-based approach to construe the disputed claim term.32
The patent was directed to balloon dilation catheters used in
coronary angioplasty procedures for removing restrictions in the
coronary arteries.33 The patentee argued that the disputed claim
24

Id at 980 (“The caveat is that any special definition given to a word must be clearly
defined in the specification.”).
25
Id.
26
Id. at 981.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 980. Note that dictionaries were considered extrinsic evidence, and
accordingly, may not vary or contradict the terms of the claims.
29
Id. at 982–83.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 982.
32
Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
33
Id. at 1339.
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term, “lumen,” included two types of catheter configurations: a
dual lumen configuration and a coaxial lumen configuration.34 The
accused infringer argued that the specification limited the scope of
the claim term to coaxial lumen catheters.35
Relying on the specification, the Scimed court determined that
the patentee disclaimed the dual lumen configuration.36 Although
the patentee suggested that the lower court had committed “one of
the cardinal sins of patent law—reading a limitation from the
written description into the claims,” the Federal Circuit disagreed
and noted that the claims were properly “read in view of the
specification, of which they are a part.”37 The court emphasized
that:
Where the specification makes clear that the invention does
not include a particular feature, that feature is deemed to be
outside the reach of the claims of the patent, even though
the language of the claims, read without reference to the
specification, might be considered broad enough to
encompass the feature in question.38
Turning to the facts of the case, the Federal Circuit noted that
the patentee overcame prior art by describing advantages of the
invention’s coaxial lumen configuration over the prior art dual
lumen catheters.39 Furthermore, the patentee described in the
34

Id.
Id.
36
Id. at 1340. Like Markman, the Scimed court spent virtually no time analyzing the
language of the claims, and instead, defined the scope of the claims by way of the written
description itself. See John Josef Molenda, Understanding The Federal Circuit’s Internal
Debate and Its Decision to Rehear Phillips v. AWH Corp. En Banc, 86 J. Pat. &
Trademark Off. Soc’y 911, 919–20 (2004).
37
Id. at 1340–41 (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976–88
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)); see Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 810 F.2d
1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“Claims are not interpreted in a vacuum, but are part of and
are read in light of the specification). See also Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris
Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186–87 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that “there is a fine line between
reading a claim in light of the specification, and reading a limitation into the claim from
the specification.”).
38
Id. at 1341.
39
Id. at 1342–43. But see Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Intel Corp., 325 F.3d 1346
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that the written description did not suggest that the invention
must always be used in a manner that achieves the advantage recited). The Northrop
35
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written description that the coaxial lumen configuration was “the
basic sleeve structure for all embodiments of the present invention
contemplated and disclosed herein.”40 Because the patentee
identified, criticized, and disclaimed the dual lumen configuration,
the scope of the disputed claim term was limited to the coaxial
lumen configuration.41
Both Markman and Scimed illustrate that reliance on the
specification was necessary in determining the meaning of the
disputed claims. If the context by which the term was used in the
claim, specification, and prosecution history was not taken into
consideration, a different outcome would likely have occurred.
Relying on the context for construing claims allows judges and the
public to understand what the patentee’s invention is. It is the
patentee’s expression of these terms in the intrinsic record that
shed light as to what the patentee meant in his claims. However,
as explained earlier, relying on the specification may run afoul of
the claim construction canon against reading limitations from the
written description into the claims.
B. Defining Claims In The Specification By Implication
In Vitronics, the Federal Circuit expanded on Markman’s
analytical framework to claim construction.42 In doing so, the
court established a hierarchy of evidence that can be used to
construe claims.43 The court required that intrinsic evidence of
record, i.e., the claims, the specification, and the prosecution
history, should be consulted before relying on extrinsic evidence.44

case, discussed infra notes 180–86 and accompanying text, is one example that shows
how the specification-based approach as applied in Scimed is different from the claimbased approach.
40
Id. at 1343. Therefore, if a patentee stated in the specification that all embodiments
contain a specific feature of the invention, the claim will be limited to that feature;
however, if the patentee did not make such a statement, that feature of the invention
contained in all the embodiments disclosed will not be read as a limitation into the
claims. See Comark, 156 F.3d at 1187 (suggesting that “particular embodiments and
examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the claims.”).
41
Id.
42
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582–83 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
43
Id. at 1582 .
44
Id.
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“Such intrinsic evidence is the most significant source of the
legally operative meaning of disputed claim language.”45
First, the court looked at the “ordinary and customary
meaning” of the claim language itself to define the scope of the
patented invention.46 Second, the court reviewed the specification
“to determine whether the inventor has used the claim terms
inconsistent with their ordinary meaning.”47 The Vitronics court
emphasized that the “specification acts as a dictionary when it
expressly defines terms used in the claims or when it defines terms
by implication.”48 The specification is “the single best guide to the
meaning of the disputed term.”49 Third, the court analyzed the
prosecution history of the patent because often it is of “critical
significance in determining the meaning of the claims.”50
Next, the court indicated that it is improper to rely on extrinsic
evidence when an analysis of the intrinsic record alone resolves
any ambiguities in a disputed claim term.51 Extrinsic evidence
“may be used only to help the court come to the proper
understanding of the claims,” but cannot be used to “vary or
45

Id.
Id. The Vitronics court noted that “[a]lthough words in a claim are generally given
their ordinary and customary meaning, a patentee may choose to be his own
lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their ordinary meaning, as long as the
special definition of the term is clearly stated in the patent specification.” Id. This case
was among the first to highlight the concept of a claim term’s “ordinary meaning,” that
may be altered by the specification explicitly or implicitly. See Michael S. Conner &
John A Wasleff, Where Do We Go from Here? A Critical Examination of Existing Claim
Construction Doctrine, 86 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 878, 882–83 (2004).
47
Id.
48
Id. (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976–88 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc)). This case marked the evolution of defining a claim term “by
implication.” The court did not explain how one can interpret or define a claim term “by
implication.” Consequently, this decision gives little guidance for competitors,
practitioners and district courts on how to use the specification to define or interpret a
claim.
49
Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582.
50
Id.
51
Id. The Federal Circuit was concerned that the public notice function of the patent
would be rendered meaningless if it could be altered by extrinsic evidence. While that is
a legitimate concern, the end result is that district court judges are burdened with an
unrealistic task of construing claims from the intrinsic evidence based on what a person
skilled in the art would understand from the claim terms, even though the judges are not
skilled in the art. See Conner & Wasleff, supra note 46 at 882.
46
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contradict the claim . . . or other parts of the patent language.” 52
The court went on to define extrinsic evidence as “evidence which
is external to the patent and file history, such as expert testimony,
inventor testimony, dictionaries, and technical treatises and
articles.”53 Since dictionaries were considered extrinsic evidence,
dictionary definitions could not “contradict any definition found in
or ascertained by reading the patent documents.”54
The doctrine of defining a claim “by implication” was further
developed in Bell Atlantic.55 Relying on the analytic framework of
Vitronics, the Federal Circuit started with the claims, and then
moved on to the specification followed by the prosecution
history.56 The court noted that the specification may clearly define
a claim term without an explicit statement of definition.57 For
instance, the “written description of the preferred embodiments
‘can provide guidance as to the meaning of the claims, thereby
dictating the manner in which the claims are to be construed, even
if the guidance is not provided in explicit definitional format.’” 58
Stated differently, the written description “may define claim terms
by implication such that the meaning may be found in or
ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.”59 Hence,
“when a patentee uses a claim throughout the entire patent
specification, in a manner consistent with only a single meaning,
he has defined that term by implication.”60
52

Id. at 1584.
Id. In a footnote, the Vitronics court noted that technical treatises and dictionaries
are special extrinsic evidence, which judges are “free to consult” at any time in order to
better understand the underlying technology and to construe disputed claim terms. Id. n.6.
54
Id.
55
Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc. et al.,
262 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
56
Id. at 1267–69.
57
Id at 1268.
58
Id. (quoting Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d
1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
59
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
60
Id. at 1271. But see Suggestion Test infra notes 158–86 and accompanying text.
The Suggestion Test employed through the claim-based approach requires that the
specification suggest that a claim term with multiple dictionary meanings was limited to
the one meaning used in the embodiments. For instance, if the patentee uses a claim
term, throughout the entire patent specification, in a manner consistent with only a single
meaning and without explicitly suggesting that the claim term was limited to that
53
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Both, Vitronics and Bell Atlantic, have suggested that
dictionaries and technical treatises hold a “special place” among
extrinsic evidence and may be consulted at any time along with the
intrinsic evidence.61
Despite the Federal Circuit’s special
treatment of dictionaries, neither Vitronics nor Bell Atlantic has
cited a dictionary definition or relied on a technical treatise to
determine the meaning of the disputed claim terms.
Interestingly, the evolution of defining a claim “by
implication” has coincided with the court’s shifting focus from the
specification to the claims. As the claim term’s “ordinary
meaning” began to have a central role in claim construction, some
Federal Circuit judges became less dependent on the specification
for determining the meaning of the claim. Those judges became
heavily dependent on dictionary definitions by employing the
claim-based approach, while others have maintained their focus on
the specification to determine an express or implicit definition of
the disputed claim terms.62
C. The Presumption of Ordinary and Accustomed Meaning and
the Court’s Increased Reliance on Dictionaries
The CCS Fitness decision was one of the earlier cases that
applied the claim-based approach to claim construction.63 That
case involved a patent directed to a stationary exercise device
known as the elliptical trainer.64 At issue was the meaning of the
claim term “reciprocating member.” 65 The patentee argued that
reciprocating member includes a curved, multi-component
structure used in the accused device, while the accused infringer
meaning, the Federal Circuit would broaden the scope of that claim term to encompass
other dictionary definitions so as to give the claim term the full breadth of its meaning.
Consequently, the Suggestion Test is in conflict with defining a claim “by implication.”
61
Id. at 1267.
62
See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1105 (2004). The
article suggests that the Federal Circuit panel can be categorized into three groups:
Proceduralists (those who prefer the claim-based approach), Holistics (those who prefer
the specification-based approach), and the Swing Judges.
63
CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
64
Id. at 1362–63.
65
Id at 1362.
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alleged that the claim term referred only to a single-component,
straight bar as disclosed in the patent drawings.66
The court began its claim-based approach with the language of
the claims.67 The court suggested that it will “indulge a ‘heavy
presumption’ that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary
meaning.”68 Moreover, the court noted that its “precedents show
that dictionary definitions may establish a claim term’s ordinary
meaning.”69 To overcome this “heavy presumption” of a claim
term’s ordinary meaning, the court suggested four ways: (1) if the
patentee acted as his own lexicographer by clearly defining the
disputed claim term in the specification or prosecution history, (2)
if the patentee expressly disclaimed subject matter or described a
particular embodiment as important to the invention, (3) if the term
chosen by the patentee so deprives the claim of clarity, and (4) if
the claim term is limited under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶6.70
Turning to the facts of the case, the CCS Fitness court relied on
a dictionary to determine the ordinary meaning of the term
“member.”71 The term “reciprocating” was agreed by both parties
to mean the “back and forth” movement of the “member.”72 Based
on these definitions, the court concluded that the “reciprocating
66

Id. at 1364.
Id. at 1366.
68
Id. (citing Johnson Worldwide Associates, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 175 F.3d 985,
989 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The significance of the Johnson Worldwide opinion is that it
contributed to the claim-based approach by creating a “heavy presumption” in favor of
the ordinary meaning of a claim term. 175 F.3d at 989. The opinion also stands for the
proposition that “[v]aried use of a disputed term in the written description demonstrates
the breadth of the term rather than providing a limited definition.” Id. at 991. But see
Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(“Where there is an equal choice between a broader and a narrower meaning of a claim,
and there is an enabling disclosure that indicates that the applicant is at least entitled to a
claim having the narrower meaning, we consider the notice function of the claim to be
best served by adopting the narrower meaning.”). The Athletic Alternatives case is
another example that shows how the claim-based approach as applied in Johnson
Worldwide is different from the specification-based approach.
69
CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366. (citing Rexnod Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d
1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
70
CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366–67.
71
Id at 1367. The definition of “member” was a “structural unit such as a. . . beam or
tie, or a combination of these.” Id. (citing MCGRAW-HILL DICTIONARY OF SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNICAL TERMS 1237 (5th ed. 1994)).
72
CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1367.
67
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member” encompasses the multi-component, curved structure used
in the accused device.”73 The court determined that there was
nothing in the specification or prosecution history that overcame
the “heavy presumption” of the claim term’s ordinary meaning.74
Specifically, the court explained that there was nothing in the
specification that required a certain shape or a certain number of
components, and the patentee did not disclaim subject matter nor
describe a single-component straight bar “member” as important to
the invention.75
In Texas Digital, the Federal Circuit expanded on CCS’s claimbased approach to claim construction.76 Like CCS Fitness, the
court began its analysis with the language of the claims themselves
because it was that “language that the patentee chose to
particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which
the patentee regards as his invention.”77 The court noted that there
is a “heavy presumption” that claim terms “mean what they say
and have the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to those
words by persons skilled in the relevant art.”78 In search for the
ordinary meaning of the disputed claim terms, the court relied
heavily on dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises.79
The Federal Circuit suggested that it had “long recognized”
that “dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises are particularly
useful resources to assist the court in determining the ordinary and
customary meanings of claim terms.”80 The court praised
dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises, and referred to them as
“objective resources that serve as reliable sources of information
on the established meanings that would have been attributed to the
73

Id. at 1367–69.
Id. at 1367
75
Id. at 1367–69
76
Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, ,308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
77
Id. at 1201–02 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶2) (internal quotations omitted).
78
Id. (citing CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366).
79
Id. at 1202.
80
Id.; But see Jennifer R. Johnson, Out of Context: Texas Digital, the Indefiniteness of
Language, and the Search for Ordinary Meaning, 44 IDEA 521, 531 (2004) (noting that
the Texas Digital court cited “five cases, supporting the notion of ‘long recognized in our
precedent;’ yet four of the five cases cited are very recent—hardly indicative of a long
precedent”—and the fifth case was an ex parte opinion from the Board of Appeals of the
Patent Office.).
74
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terms of the claims by those of skill in the art.” 81 The court
explained that these “references are unbiased reflections of
common understanding not influenced by expert testimony or
events subsequent to the fixing of the intrinsic record by the grant
of the patent, not colored by the motives of the parties, and not
inspired by litigation.”82
While Vitronics regarded all the intrinsic evidence as the “most
significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed
claim language,”83 the Texas Digital court regarded dictionaries,
encyclopedias and treatises as the “most meaningful sources of
information to aid judges in better understanding both the
technology and the terminology used by those skilled in the art.”84
The court further noted that “it is entirely proper for both trial and
appellate judges to consult these materials at any stage of a
litigation, regardless of whether they have been offered by a party
in evidence or not.”85 Due to the heightened significance of these
resource materials, the court emphasized that “categorizing them
as ‘extrinsic evidence’ or even a ‘special form of extrinsic
evidence’ is misplaced and does not inform the analysis.”86
Finally, the court cautioned that consulting the specification or
prosecution history before discerning the ordinary and customary
meanings, “invites a violation of our precedent counseling against
importing limitations into the claims.”87 Hence, by examining
resource materials first, “the full breadth of the limitations intended
by the inventor will be more accurately determined and improper

81
Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1203. But see Conner & Wasleff, supra note 46 at 886
(suggesting that any expectation that reference materials available to a court will be
unbiased by litigation is unrealistic because there is a “selection bias that is at least as real
as the bias of a testifying advocate, but perhaps less obvious.”).
82
Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1203.
83
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
84
Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1203.
85
Id.; But see Br. Of The American Bar Association As Amicus Curiae Supporting
Neither Party at 10–11, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 031269, 03-1286) (requesting that the court would rely on dictionaries only when made part
of the record and parties were given the opportunity to address, challenge, or rebut that
material).
86
Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1203.
87
Id. at 1204.
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importation of unintended limitations from the written description
into the claims will be more easily avoided.”88
This opinion evinces the Federal Circuit’s increasing
dependence on dictionaries for claim construction. In order to
avoid reading limitations into the claims, a common criticism of
the specification-based approach, the Texas Digital court
disfavored the use of the specification and prosecution history in
claim construction. However, by discounting the value of the
intrinsic record in claim interpretation, the court has failed to
account for the context by which the term was used in the
specification and the prosecution history. As explained earlier,
such context provides the patentee’s expression and intent on what
he meant in his claims.89
D. Overcoming the “Heavy Presumption” of a Claim Term’s
Ordinary Meaning
There is a “heavy presumption” that a claim term carries its
ordinary and customary meaning.90 This section explores the four
ways that the CCS Fitness court outlined for overcoming this
“heavy presumption.”
1. Patentee Acted As His Own Lexicographer
One way to overcome the “heavy presumption” that a claim
term carries its ordinary and customary meaning is if the “patentee
acted as his own lexicographer and clearly set forth a definition of
the disputed claim term in either the specification or prosecution
history.”91 The definition must be made with “reasonable clarity,
deliberateness, and precision.”92
Expressly defining a disputed claim term in the specification
was addressed in Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania, Inc.93 The
patent-in-suit was related to encapsulated electron-luminescent
88

Id. at 1205.
See supra notes 18–41 and accompanying text.
90
CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
91
Id. at 1366.
92
Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(quoting In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
93
Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 256 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
89
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phosphor particles used in illuminating watch faces and other
instrument panels.94 At issue was the meaning of the claim term
“oxide coating” that encapsulated the phosphor particles.95 Since
the specification expressly defined the “oxide coating,”96 the court
adopted that definition for its claim interpretation.97 However,
because the parties disputed the interpretation of that definition, the
court relied on dictionaries to support its understanding of the
disputed claim term.98 The court emphasized that it is free to
consult the dictionary “so long as the dictionary definition does not
contradict any definition found in or ascertained by a reading of
the patent document.”99
While this rule seems straightforward, Federal Circuit judges,
employing the claim-based approach, are not always comfortable
in using the specification as the primary source for construing
disputed claim terms. For instance, in Merck & Co. v. Teva
Pharms. USA, Inc., the majority decision disregarded the
patentee’s express definition of a claim phrase in the specification
in favor of a dictionary definition.100 The patent-in-suit was
directed to a method of treating and preventing osteoporosis
through the administration of a chemical compound.101 Even
though the patentee included the entire claim phrase in the
specification, enclosed it with quotation marks, and
unambiguously defined its meaning, the majority opinion
abstracted the claim term out of its context, and instead, adopted its
ordinary dictionary meaning.102

94

Id. at 1300.
Id.
96
The term “oxide coating” was defined as a “material made up primarily of metallic
ions and oxygen, but which may contain minor amounts of other elements and
compounds originating in the precursor materials or phosphor particles.”
97
Id. at 1303–04.
98
Id. at 1304.
99
Id. (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584, n.6 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
100
Merck v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed.. Cir. 2005) (construing
the claim phrase “about 70 mg of alendronate monosodium triydrate, on an alendronic
acid basis.”)
101
Id. at 1366–67.
102
Id. at 1380 (Rader, J., dissenting).
95
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This prompted the dissent to accuse the majority for “paying
only lip service to the often-cited, but rarely followed
lexicographer rule.”103 The dissent emphasized that because the
majority failed to honor patentee’s express definition, the majority
decision effectively rewrote the specification.104 In essence, the
majority’s claim construction resulted in importing limitations
from the dictionary into the claims, wholly aside from what the
patentee has chosen.105 While the goal of the claim-based
approach is to avoid importing limitations into the claims, the
Merck case demonstrates that liberal dictionary use can run afoul
of this objective.
2. Patentee Disclaimed Subject Matter
When a patentee describes what a claim term means, he acts as
a lexicographer, and when he describes what a claim term does not
mean, he disclaims that subject matter.106 Unlike the lexicographer
rule, disclaimer of subject matter can result from express or
implied statements made in the specification or the prosecution
history.107 For instance, in Scimed, the court noted that the
patentee distinguished the dual lumen catheters by highlighting its
disadvantages in comparison to the coaxial lumen configuration.108
Accordingly, the court held that the dual lumen configuration was
disclaimed in the specification and the patentee could not broaden
the claims to encompass that configuration.109

103

Id. at 1377.
Id.
105
Id.
106
Joseph Yang et al., Navigating The Federal Circuit’s Markman Jurisprudence, 795
PLI/Pat 733, 758–59 (2004).
107
Astrazeneca AB v. Mutual Pharm. Co., 384 F.3d 1333, 1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(emphasizing that clear disavowal of subject matter does not have to be express, but can
be implied from the written description); see Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the patentee
criticized and disclaimed a particular feature in the specification, thereby limiting the
claim scope); see Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int’l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951,
956–57 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that an inventor disclaimed a particular feature during
prosecution, thereby modifying the term’s ordinary meaning).
108
Scimed, 242 F.3d at 1342–43; see supra notes 32–41 and accompanying text.
109
Id.
104
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One example where the patentee disclaimed subject matter in
the prosecution history is illustrated in Omega Eng., Inc. v. Raytek
Corp.110 The court explained that the doctrine of prosecution
disclaimer precludes the “patentees from recapturing through claim
interpretation specific meanings disclaimed during prosecution.”111
The rationale behind the doctrine is that it “promotes the public
notice function of the intrinsic evidence and protects the public’s
reliance on definitive statements made during prosecution.”112 To
constitute a disclaimer or disavowal of claim scope, the
prosecution statements must not be too vague or ambiguous;
rather, it must be effected with “reasonable clarity and
deliberateness.”113 Hence, for prosecution disclaimer to attach,
“the alleged disavowing actions or statements made during
prosecution [must] be both clear and unmistakable.”114 Turning to
the facts of the case, the court determined that the patentee made a
clear and unmistakable prosecution disclaimer, thereby limiting the
scope of the disputed claim term.115
Another example where the patentee disclaimed subject matter
in the prosecution history is provided in Springs Window Fashions
LP v. Novo Indus., L.P.116 Highlighting the public notice function
of a patent and its prosecution history, the court emphasized that
“[a] patentee may not state during prosecution that the claims do
not cover a particular device and then change position and later sue
a party who makes that same device for infringement.”117 If the
court adopts the patentee’s position, it “would undercut the public
reliance on a statement that was in the public record and upon
which reasonable competitors formed their business strategies.”118
The Federal Circuit noted that if the patentee disclaimed coverage
110

Omega Eng., Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323–25 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1323.
112
Id. at 1324.
113
Id. at 1325 (citing Northern Telecom. Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 1281,
1294–95 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
114
Id. at 1325–26.
115
Id. at 1226.
116
Springs Window Fashions LP v. Novo Indus., L.P., 323 F.3d 989, 994–96 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
117
Id. at 995.
118
Id. (citing Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int’l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 957
(Fed. Cir. 2000)).
111
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of the claimed invention by mistake, he “should have amended the
file to reflect the error, as the applicant is the party in the best
position to do so.”119 Since the patentee did not retract any
statements made during prosecution, the court narrowed the claim
scope to exclude the disclaimed subject matter.120
3. Claim Lacks Clarity
Another way to overcome the “heavy presumption” that a
claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning is if the
term “chosen by the patentee so deprive[s] the claim of clarity that
there is no means by which the scope of the claim may be
ascertained from the language used.”121 When such circumstances
occur, reference to other intrinsic evidence, or in some cases, to
extrinsic evidence is proper.122 If the specification and prosecution
history sheds light to the meaning of the “unclear” claim term, then
referring to extrinsic evidence is not permitted.123
By way of example, in CCS, the accused infringer argued that
the disputed claim term “reciprocating member” had no ordinary
and customary meaning to one of ordinary skill in the art.124 To
support its argument, the accused infringer presented expert
testimony to establish that the disputed claim term lacks clear
meaning.125 The court rejected the use of expert testimony, and
noted that the ordinary meaning of the claim term can be resolved
by referring to the intrinsic evidence and dictionary.126

119

Id.
Id. For more on disclaimers, see Nagendra Setty & David S. Kerven, From
Dictionaries To Disclaimers: Following The Federal Circuit From Texas To Disneyland,
795 PLI/Pat 427 (2004).
121
Johnson Worldwide Associates, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
122
Id. (citing J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atlantic Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1568 (Fed.
Cir. 1997), North Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1993), Comark Communications., Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir.
1998) and Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
123
Id.
124
CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1365–67 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
125
Id.
126
Id. at 1368–69.
120
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Accordingly, the accused infringer failed to overcome the “heavy
presumption.”127
In Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., the accused infringer
also presented expert testimony to clarify the meaning of the claim
term “pharmaceutically effective amount.”128
The court
determined that the intrinsic evidence did not clarify the meaning
of the disputed claim term, and therefore, relied on extrinsic
evidence.129 Based on that evidence, the court held that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would understand the claim term to mean
an amount sufficient to provide a patient with 2.5 to 15mg/day.130
4. Claim Construction Limited Under 35 U.S.C. §112, ¶6
The final method that the Federal Circuit has suggested in
overcoming the “heavy presumption” is if the patentee drafted the
claim pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.131 The patent statute
provides that:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed
as a means or step for performing a specified function
without the recital of structure, material or acts in support
thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the
corresponding structure, material or acts described in the
specification and equivalents thereof.132
Technically, this statute does not overcome the presumption;
rather, it prevents the Federal Circuit from employing the claimbased approach because the statute mandates the use of the
specification in interpreting a claim element.133 The statute allows
a patent applicant to claim an invention using functional language
instead of structural language.134 A court interpreting this
functional claim language must ascertain the corresponding

127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Id. at 1367.
Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 713–15 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Id. at 716–718.
Id. at 718.
CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1367.
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
Id.
Id.
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structure from the written description rather than rely on the
ordinary meaning of the claim term.135
E. Linguistic Analysis Of Claims
One of the key features of the claim-based approach is the
linguistic analysis of claims. Federal Circuit judges that employ
the claim-based approach spend a considerable amount of their
opinion on the claim language used.136 This linguistic analysis
focuses more on the English language used and less on the claimed
invention.137 In most cases, the alleged infringer seeks to alter the
language of the claim term to what was disclosed in the
specification or argued during patent prosecution.138 However, in
a claim-based approach, it is the language of the claims themselves
that control.139
Application of the linguistic analysis to claim construction is
illustrated in Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp.140 At
issue was the meaning of the claim term “discharge rate” that
appeared twice in the claim.141 Relying on the specification, the
accused infringer asserted that the first occurrence of the disputed
claim term should carry a different meaning from the second
occurrence.142 The Federal Circuit rejected that argument and
noted that the term “a discharge rate” in the first occurrence refers
to the same rate as the term “the discharge rate” in the second
occurrence.143 The court explained that such interpretation “avoids
any lack of antecedent basis problem for the [second] occurrence
of ‘the discharge rate.’”144
135
See Mirco Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
136
Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, Inc., 214 F.3d 1302, 1306–09 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 329 F.3d 823, 831–32 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
140
Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
141
Id. at 1354–55.
142
Id. at 1355–57.
143
Id. at 1356.
144
Id. at 1356–57. The court suggested that both occurrences refer to “the rate (in units
of weight per unit of time) that material is discharged from the common hopper to the
material processing machine.” Id. at 1356. The court also explained that this was not a
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Similarly, in Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l,
Inc., the ordinary meaning of the disputed claim term conflicted
with what was disclosed in the specification.145 The claim recites a
range “only within a zone extending between latitudes 30 degrees
[to] 45 degrees.”146 Meanwhile, the preferred embodiment
disclosed a range between 0 degrees to 45 degrees.147 The patentee
claimed less than what was initially disclosed in the specification
because he had to narrow his claim to overcome the prior art.148
Analyzing the language of the claims, the Federal Circuit
explained that “the terms ‘only’ and ‘extending between’
unambiguously limit claim 1 to . . . a zone stretching exclusively in
the space separating the latitudes 30 degrees and 45 degrees.”149
The court emphasized that the “unambiguous language of the
amended claim controls over any contradictory language in the
written description.”150 This is true even if such claim construction
would exclude the preferred and only embodiment disclosed in the
specification.151
Because the linguistic approach focuses on the language of the
claims themselves, even inconsistent statements made during
patent prosecution were disregarded by the Federal Circuit over the
plain language of the claims.152 In Storage Technology Corp. v.
Cisco Systems, Inc., the disputed claim terms were “caching policy

situation where the patentee acted as his own lexicographer to warrant circumvention of
the claim term’s ordinary meaning. Id.
145
Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, Inc., 214 F.3d 1302, 1304–07 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
146
Id. at 1306.
147
Id. at 1306–09.
148
See id. at 1308.
149
Id. at 1307.
150
Id. at 1308.
151
Id. This is a case where the patentee’s disclaimer of subject matter is reflected in the
ordinary meaning of the claim term. Although prosecution disclaimer is used to rebut the
“heavy presumption” that a claim term carries it ordinary meaning, the Elekta court did
not address this issue because the amended claim term was narrowly drafted and not
susceptible to a broader ordinary meaning. See also supra notes 110–20 and
accompanying text (illustrating how prosecution disclaimers can limit the scope of
disputed claim terms).
152
Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 329 F.3d 823, 832 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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identification information” and “network policy”153 The accused
infringer argued that the meaning of the claim was narrowed
during prosecution.154 Specifically, the patentees stated that the
network policy and the policy identification information are both
cached.155 While the court acknowledged that this statement
appears to limit the claim scope, it suggested that “it cannot do so
absent some claim language referring to the caching of the instance
of network policy.”156 Hence, the court concluded that an
applicant’s erroneous or “inaccurate statement cannot override the
claim language itself, which controls the bounds of the claim.”157
F. The Rise Of The Suggestion Test In Claim Construction
Ever since the claim-based approach has surfaced as an
alternate method to claim construction, the Federal Circuit has
increasingly applied a “Suggestion Test” to justify broad
interpretation of disputed claim terms.158 The Suggestion Test is
premised on the assumption that if a patentee intended to narrow a
claim term with multiple dictionary definitions, he would have
specifically suggested that in the specification.159 This assumption
has created an undue burden on accused infringers because they
are required to prove a patentee’s intent to deviate from a claim
term’s multiple meanings even if the patentee has only used one
meaning consistently throughout the patent.160
Although the United States patent system requires patent
applicants to claim what the invention is, as opposed to what it is
153

Id. at 830–31. In computers, a cache is a “small fast memory holding recently
accessed data, designed to speed up subsequent access to the same data.” The Free OnLine
Dictionary
Of
Computing,
at
http://wombat.doc.ic.ac.uk/foldoc/
foldoc.cgi?query=cache (last modified June 25, 1997).
154
Storage Tech Corp. 329 F.3d. at 830.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 832.
157
Id. But see supra prosecution disclaimer notes 110–20 and accompanying text.
158
Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 134–48 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Teleflex,
Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Sunrace
Roots Enter. Co., Ltd. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
159
See Texas Digital Sys. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(“there is nothing in the record to suggest that ‘activating’ means other than what its
dictionary definition would suggest”).
160
See Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1327–1328.
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not, the court’s rationale behind the Suggestion Test suggests
otherwise. The court’s analysis focuses more on whether any of a
claim term’s multiple dictionary definitions were excluded or
disclaimed, rather than on whether the patentee used that claim
term in the specification to connote more than one meaning.161
Consequently, if a patent applicant uses a claim term in a manner
consistent with only a single meaning, and without explicitly
suggesting that the claim term was limited to that meaning, the
Federal Circuit would broaden the scope to include other
dictionary meanings.162 This indicates that the court’s Suggestion
Test to claim construction mandates a central form of definition
that is in conflict with our patent system’s peripheral form.163
Even when the specification touts an advantage of the
invention consistent with only one meaning to the disputed claim
term, the Federal Circuit would refuse to narrow that claim term’s
ordinary meaning.164 Typically, the court’s justification is based
on the fact that the written description does not suggest the
161
Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Although it
appears that the Suggestion Test is similar to the disclaimer doctrine, it is different in
many respects. First, the disclaimer doctrine analyzes statements made in the
specification or prosecution history, while the Suggestion Test states in the abstract that
there are no statements made in the specification or prosecution history. Second, the
disclaimer doctrine is used to narrow the scope of the disputed claim term, while the
Suggestion Test is used to broaden the scope of that claim term. Third, and more
importantly, the disclaimer doctrine has a lower mens rea requirement that the Suggestion
Test. An accused infringer may prove disclaimer through statements made by mistake;
however, to satisfy the Suggestion Test, the accused infringer must prove that the
patentee intended to deviate from a claim term’s multiple meanings.
162
See Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1327–28. As emphasized earlier, the Suggestion Test is in
conflict with defining a claim “by implication.” See supra notes 42–62 and
accompanying text.
163
“Central definition involves the drafting of a narrow claim setting forth a typical
embodiment coupled with broad interpretation by the courts to include all equivalent
constructions. Peripheral definition involves marking out the periphery . . . area covered
by the claim and holding as infringements only such constructions as lie within that
area.” Id. See also Ex Parte Fressola, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1608, 1609–1610 (Bd.Pat.App &
Interf. 1993) (noting that the method of claiming has shifted from the central definition to
the peripheral definition); Martin J. Adelman et al., Cases And Materials on Patent Law,
634–642 (American Casebook Series 1998).
164
Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Intel Corp., 325 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
But see Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337,
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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invention must be used only in a manner that achieves the recited
advantage.165 Likewise, if the specification did not suggest that the
patent limits the claims to the disclosed embodiments, the court
would refuse to narrow the ordinary meaning of a claim term
described in the context of these embodiments.166 Consequently,
the Federal Circuit would broaden the scope of a claim term unless
the patentee explicitly suggested in the specification, and not in the
context of the embodiments, that any of the claim term’s multiple
dictionary definitions were either excluded or disclaimed.167
The controversial nature of the Suggestion Test is best
illustrated in Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp.168 The
patent was directed to a device that allows attachment of a shift
cable to an automatic transmission vehicle.169 At issue was the
meaning of the claim term “clip.”170 The court noted that the
specification described only one embodiment of “clip” as having a
“single pair of legs.” 171 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the
term “clip” is not limited to “single pair of legs.”172 Instead of
determining whether the patentee used the term “clip” in the
specification to connote more than one meaning, the court
determined that there was nothing in the specification that
suggested the claim term was limited to the disclosed
165

Northrop, 325 F.3d at 1355 (holding that a recited advantage of the invention
consistent with only one meaning of the disputed claim term was one of several
objectives, and the specification did “not suggest that the invention must always be used
in a manner that achieves that objective.”); Brookhill-Wilk., 334 F.3d at 1301 (“The
objective described is merely one of several objectives that can be achieved through the
use of the invention; the written description does not suggest that the invention must be
used only in a manner to attain that objective.”).
166
Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1327–28 (“an accused infringer cannot overcome the ‘heavy
presumption’ that a claim term takes on its ordinary meaning simply by pointing to the
preferred embodiment or other structures or steps disclosed in the specification or
prosecution history.”); Sunrace Roots Enter. Co. Ltd. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298,
1305 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“while it is clear that the patentee was primarily focused on an
embodiment of his invention using a cam, nothing in the patent limits the claims to that
embodiment.”)
167
See Altiris, 318 F.3d at 1371.
168
Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1327–28.
169
Id. at 1318.
170
Id. at 1327–28.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 1328.
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embodiment.173 Accordingly, the Teleflex court expanded the
meaning of “clip” beyond what was disclosed in the specification.
Similarly, in Sunrace Roots Enter. Co., Ltd. v. SRAM Corp.,
the court applied the Suggestion Test to broaden the scope of the
disputed claim term.174 The parties disputed the meaning of the
term “shift actuator,” a component used in a bicycle gear-shifting
system.175 The court determined that the ordinary meaning of
“shift actuator” is a “mechanism that controls the changing of
gears.”176 Based on a number of statements made in the
specification, the accused infringer argued that the “shift actuator”
must be limited to a device containing a cam structure.177 One
statement in the specification described the cam member as the
“heart” of the shift actuator.178 Even with such a clear and
unambiguous statement, the court concluded that “nothing in the
written description indicates that the invention is exclusively
directed toward cams or suggests that systems not employing cams
are outside the scope of the invention.179
Another case that employed the Suggestion Test is Northrop
Grumman Corp. v. Intel Corp.180 At issue was the meaning of the
term “bus interface unit.”181 The ordinary meaning of that term
was determined to be a “unit for interfacing with a serial data
bus.”182 The patentee conceived that the invention “would be used
principally, if not exclusively, in a ‘command/response’
environment.”183 Despite the fact that the specification referred
repeatedly to advantages of the invention in the context of a
173

Id.
Sunrace Roots Enter. Co. Ltd. V. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 1299 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
175
Id.
176
Id. at 1302.
177
Id. at 1304.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 1305; but see Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.,
242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“when the preferred embodiment is described as
the invention itself, the claims are not entitled to a broader scope than that embodiment”)
(internal quotations omitted).
180
Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Intel Corp., 325 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id. at 1355.
174
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“command/response” environment, the court refused to limit the
scope of the disputed claim term.184 The court explained that
nothing in the specification “suggests that the invention must
always be used in a manner that achieves that objective.”185 Once
again the court improperly expanded the scope of the claim term
even when the patentee used the term in the specification
consistent with only one meaning.186
G. Inherent Problems Associated With Specification-Based And
Claim-Based Approaches
Opponents of the specification-based approach have criticized
this approach for importing extraneous limitations from the written
description into the claims.187 They contend that there is no “need”
to use these limitations in interpreting the claims.188 They
exaggerate that “[i]f we once begin to include elements not
mentioned in the claim in order to limit such claim . . ., we should
never know where to stop.”189 They do, however, correctly point
out that “[i]f everything in the specification were required to be
read into the claims, or if structural claims were to be limited to
devices operated precisely as a specification-described
embodiment is operated, there would be no need for claims.”190
Also, there would be no need, “regardless of the prior art, [to]
claim more broadly than that embodiment.”191 Likewise, there
would be no need for the patent applicant to conclude his written
description with “claims particularly pointing out and distinctly
184

Id.
Id.
186
Id.; but see Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (“where there are several common meanings for a claim term, the patent
disclosure serves to point away from the improper meanings and toward the proper
meanings.”)
187
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1434 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (explaining that “extraneous” limitation means a “limitation read into a claim
from the specification wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by
particular words or phrases in the claim.”)
188
Id.
189
Johnson Worldwide Assoc., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
190
See Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp. et al., 299 F.3d 1313, 1326 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
191
Id.
185
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claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention.”192 As a result, opponents to the specification-based
approach prefer to focus solely on the language of the claims.
Their claim construction inquiry “begins and ends in all cases with
the actual words of the claim.”193
Like the specification-based approach, the claim-based
approach is not free of criticism. Proponents of the claim-based
approach are often accused of ignoring the purpose or object that
the patent seeks to accomplish.194 Courts employing the claimbased approach have made a “fortress out of the dictionary,”195
converting their extrinsic nature into “technical terms of art having
legal . . . significance.”196 These courts always rely on dictionaries
to determine the “ordinary and customary meaning” of a disputed
claim term.197 However, their reliance on dictionaries for
increased clarity of claim terms “results from a misplaced faith in
the efficacy of that process. The result is that more words are
added, with the outcome being only the substitution of one
uncertainty for another.”198 This problem is compounded when

192

Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112).
Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir.
1998); see Intellectual Property Dev., Inc. v. UA Columbia Cablevision of Westchester,
Inc., 336 F.3d 1308, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“In construing claims, the analytical focus
must begin and remain centered on the language of the claims themselves, for it is that
language that the patentee chose to use to ‘particularly point[ ] out and distinctly claim[ ]
the subject matter which the patentee regards as his invention.’”).
194
See Michael S. Conner & John A Wasleff, Where Do We Go From Here? A Critical
Examination Of Existing Claim Construction Doctrine, 86 J. Pat. & Trademark Off.
Soc’y 878, 879 (2004).
195
Id.
196
Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(“Courts must exercise caution lest dictionary definitions, usually the least controversial
source of extrinsic evidence, be converted into technical terms of art having legal, not
linguistic, significance. The best source for understanding a technical term is the
specification from which it arose, informed, as needed, by the prosecution history.”)
197
Id.
198
Jennifer R. Johnson, Out of Context: Texas Digital, The Indefiniteness of Language,
and the Search for Ordinary Meaning, 44 IDEA 521, 533 (2004) (internal quotations
omitted). See Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1311 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (unnecessarily relying on a dictionary to construe the claim term “or”).
193
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courts rely on more than one dictionary to define the meaning of
the disputed claim term.199
Proponents of the claim-based approach characterize
dictionaries as “unbiased reflections of common understanding not
influenced by expert testimony . . ., not colored by the motives of
the parties, and not inspired by litigation.”200 However, they fail to
recognize that “[t]here is a selection bias that is at least as real as
the bias of a testifying advocate, but perhaps less obvious.”201
Parties supplying the dictionary definitions are “usually quite
capable of finding references to furnish at least a colorable
argument supporting their respective positions.”202 Therefore, any
expectation that the dictionary definition is unbiased or uninspired
by litigation is “unrealistic.”203
One of the shortcomings of the claim-based approach is that it
has no standard for determining the resource materials used in
construing claims. The Federal Circuit did not indicate the type of
resource materials it prefers, and the pertinent date for selecting
these materials. Their “decisions have not always been consistent
as to whether the pertinent date is the filing date of the application
or the issue date of the patent.”204 Some cases have suggested that
the pertinent date is the issue date of the patent.205 This is
problematic because these sources were not available to the patent
applicant for access at the time he or she has filed the patent
application.206 Even if the court identified the version and edition
199

Apex Inc. v. Raritan Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d 1364, 1373–75 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(relying on three dictionaries to determine the meaning of the disputed term).
200
Texas Digital Sys. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
201
Michael S. Conner & John A Wasleff, Where Do We Go From Here? A Critical
Examination Of Existing Claim Construction Doctrine, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 878, 886 (2004).
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Inverness Medical Switzerland GmbH v. Warner Lambert Co., 309 F.3d 1373, 1378
n.2 (Fed. Cir 2002).
205
Id. (noting that dictionary definitions must be as of the date the patents issued). See
also Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1299 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (rejecting references that were dated well after the issue date of the patent).
206
Jennifer R. Johnson, Out Of Context: Texas Digital, The Indefiniteness Of Language,
And The Search For Ordinary Meaning, 44 IDEA 521, 536 (2004) (suggesting that the
“group of dictionaries that the court considers proper may well include sources that the
applicant not only did not have access to but also those he could not have had access to
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of a universal dictionary that it prefers, it would be difficult for
competitors to locate this resource material, which could date back
a decade or two.207
In the name of efficiency and predictability, many
commentators champion the use of the claim-based approach.208
They suggest that this formalistic approach promotes the public
notice function because it “emphasizes the meanings of claims
within the four corners of a patent.”209 In reality, the claim-based
approach is not predictable because competitors cannot determine
in advance what reference dictionary the court will rely on in
interpreting the claims. Since the court has endorsed the
consultation of dictionaries “at any stage of a litigation, regardless
of whether they have been offered by a party in evidence or
not,”210 even the parties to the litigation do not get an advance
notice and an opportunity to address, challenge, or rebut the court’s
dictionary definition.211 Therefore, it seems unlikely that the
claim-based approach promotes the public notice function.
Ideally, courts should construe claims consistent with the
method used by the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”).
However, when courts employ the claim-based approach, their
claim construction differs. Under PTO practice, “the meaning of
the terms in the claims may be ascertainable by reference to the
[written] description.”212 PTO examiners rarely depend on
dictionaries for interpreting claim terms; rather, they “frequently
because they may have become ‘publicly available’ between the time he submitted his
application and its issue.”).
207
Daniel S. Matthews, Baffled: Phillips v. AWH Corp. And The Reexamination Of
Dictionary Use In Patent Claim Interpretation, 6 N.C.J.L. & Tech. 153, 162 (2004).
208
Ruoyu Roy Wang, Texas Digital Systems v. Telegenix, Inc.: Toward A More
Formalistic Patent Claim Construction Model, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 153, 167–173
(2004); Anthony R. Zeuli & Rachel Clark Hughey, Avoiding Patent Claim Construction
Errors: Determining The Ordinary And Customary Meaning Before Reading The Written
Description, 51 Fed. Law. 29, 29–30 (June 2004).
209
See Ruoyu Roy Wang, supra note 208 at 169–71.
210
Texas Digital Sys. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
211
See Br. Of The American Bar Association As Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither
Party at 10–11; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-1269,
03-1286).
212
Br. For The United States As Amicus Curiae at 10–12; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376
F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286) (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.175(d)(1)).
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rely on their own understanding” of the terms and the “context” by
which these terms are used in the specification.213 Consequently,
PTO examiners interpret claims in the broadest reasonable sense
and not the broadest sense possible.214 When courts apply the
claim-based approach, they run the risk that their claim
interpretation is “at odds with the PTO’s interpretation in issuing
the patent.”215
The advantage of the claim-based approach is the ease by
which courts can rely on dictionaries to construe claims.216
However, this ease encourages superficial claim construction with
inadequate technical understanding of the invention. Judges focus
more on the “ordinary meaning” of claims and less on how a
person skilled in the art would understand the claims.217 This is
true because judges attribute more evidentiary weight to
dictionaries and devalue the role of expert testimony.218 As a
result, more and more decisions employing the claim-based
approach have imported “extraneous limitations” from the
dictionary into the claims.219
II. THE ROLE OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IN CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
“Extrinsic evidence is that evidence which is external to the
patent and file history, such as expert testimony, inventor
testimony, dictionaries, and technical treatises and articles.”220 It is
at the lower end of the hierarchy of evidence that can be used to

213

Id.
Id.
215
Id.
216
See Ruoyu Roy Wang, supra note 208 at 168–69.
217
Michael S. Conner & John A. Wasleff, Where Do We Go From Here? A Critical
Examination Of Existing Claim Construction Doctrine, 86 J. Pat. & Trademark Off.
Soc’y 878, 879–80 (2004).
218
Id.
219
Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
220
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Note
that the Texas Digital court emphasized that “categorizing [dictionaries] as ‘extrinsic
evidence’ or even a ‘special form of extrinsic evidence’ is misplaced and does not inform
the analysis.” Texas Digital Sys. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
214
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construe claims.221 Generally speaking, extrinsic evidence cannot
change the meaning of a claim term discernible from the intrinsic
record.222 Extrinsic evidence “may be used only to help the court
come to the proper understanding of the claims; it may not be used
to vary or contradict the claim language.”223
In most cases, an analysis of the intrinsic record, i.e., the
claims, the specification, and the prosecution history, will suffice
in resolving any ambiguity in a disputed claim term.224 In these
circumstances, extrinsic evidence “is entitled to no weight” and
reliance on such evidence is improper.225 However, if after
considering all the intrinsic evidence there is still some ambiguity,
a trial court may rely on extrinsic evidence to determine the
meaning of the disputed claim term.226 “Such instances will rarely,
if ever, occur.”227
Even when the patent documents are unambiguous, “it is
entirely appropriate, perhaps even preferable, for a court to consult
trustworthy extrinsic evidence to ensure that the claim construction
it is tending to from the patent file is not inconsistent with clearly
expressed, plainly apposite, and widely held understandings in the
pertinent technical field.”228 Indeed, using extrinsic evidence to
guide the court in understanding the technology ensures the
prospects of proper claim construction that is not “at variance with
the understanding of one skilled in the art.”229
221

Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582–84.
Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
223
Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582–84.
224
Id.at 1583. (“In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will
resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term.”)
225
Id. at 1584.
226
Id.; Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[A]
trial court is quite correct in hearing and relying on expert testimony on an ultimate claim
construction question in cases in which the intrinsic evidence . . .[] does not answer the
question.”)
227
Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584.
228
Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
see also Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also
Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
229
Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1309; see Br. Of The American Bar Association As
Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 6–8, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286) (advocating that a court should “‘always’
consult secondary sources for education on the technology.”)
222
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It is also appropriate to consider inventor testimony “to provide
background information, including explanation of the problems
that existed at the time the invention was made and the inventor’s
solution to these problems.”230 Although the subjective intent of
the inventor has “no probative weight in determining the scope of a
claim, this statement does not disqualify the inventor as a witness,
or overrule the large body of precedent that recognizes the value of
the inventor’s testimony.”231 The inventor is a competent witness
who is experienced in the field of the invention.232 Inventor
testimony may be used to explain the invention, but it may not be
used to vary or contradict the scope of the claims.233
These guidelines for using extrinsic evidence allow
competitors to rely on “the public record, apply the established
rules of claim construction, ascertain the scope of the patentee’s
claimed invention and, thus, design around the claimed
invention.”234 The guidelines prevent the patentee from altering
the scope of the claims at trial to read on an accused device.235
Moreover, the guidelines preclude accused infringers from varying
or contradicting the ordinary meaning of a disputed claim term.236
While some extrinsic evidence, such as expert or inventor
testimony, may be biased reflections of common understanding,
colored by motives of the parties, and inspired by litigation,237
admissibility of such evidence is safeguarded through a trial
court’s “gate keeping” duties.238 Trial judges are likely to admit
230

Voice Techs.. Group., Inc. v. VMC Sys., Inc., 164 F.3d 605, 615 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
232
Id.
233
Id.; but see Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372 (Fed Cir. 2000)
(noting that a trial judge should not consider inventor testimony when trying to determine
what invention was disclosed in the specification.).
234
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
235
Id.
236
Id. at 1582–83.
237
Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(implying that dictionaries are better than expert testimony because they are unbiased
sources of information).
238
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)
(discussing a trial judges role under Fed. R. Evid. 702 in admitting expert testimony
based on scientific knowledge); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147
(1999) (extending the gate keeping requirement from scientific to all expert testimony).
231
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expert or inventor testimony only when it is relevant and
reliable.239 If the district court distrusts this testimony, the court
has the authority to appoint an expert or a technical advisor.240
This provides the trial court the ability to ascertain the meaning of
a disputed claim term consistently with the understanding of one
skilled in the art. Despite the valuable educational role of extrinsic
evidence, some courts are confused on whether to consider the
evidence when the patent documents are unambiguous.241
III. OVERLAPPING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION WITH VALIDITY
ANALYSIS
At the district court level, claim construction occurs during a
Markman hearing, while a validity analysis occurs during the trial.
At the Federal Circuit level, typically both issues are addressed
separately in the opinion.242 However, occasionally some Federal
Circuit judges commingle their validity analysis with claim
construction.243 They require that “[c]laims amenable to more than
one construction should, when it is reasonably possible to do so, be
construed to preserve their validity.”244 However, this does not
mean that courts are permitted to redraft claims to maintain their

239

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
See TechSearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(allowing trial judges to appoint technical advisors); Fed. R. Evid. 706 (allowing trial
judges to appoint expert witnesses).
241
See Br. Of The American Bar Association As Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither
Party at 6–8, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-1269, 031286) (suggesting that lower courts are confused about the proper role of extrinsic
evidence).
242
Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998); MasHamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Key Pharms. v.
Herconn Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709 (1998).
243
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1434 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (using expert testimony and extrinsic evidence to determine “a
pharmaceutically effective amount” that would maintain the validity of the claim phrase);
Modine Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(importing the range 0.015–0.040 from the specification into the claims to maintain the
validity of the claim term “relatively small”).
244
Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
240
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validity.245 “Where the only claim construction that is consistent
with the claim’s language and the written description renders the
claim invalid, then the axiom does not apply and the claim is
simply invalid.”246 Hence, after employing all the tools to claim
construction, if the claim is ambiguous or rendered invalid under
§§ 102, 103, or 112, the Federal Circuit will not “save” the claim
from invalidity by reading extraneous limitations into it.247
Safeguarding the validity of claims during claim construction
invites a patent holder to present exceedingly broad interpretation
of claims to read on an accused device,248 or in the alternative,
present narrow interpretation of claims to avoid the prior art.249 In
the event that a broad interpretation renders the claims invalid, the
court would narrow the scope of the claims to maintain the validity
of the patent.250 This encourages patentees to abuse the legal
system because, in many instances, they seek to alter the scope of
the claims beyond what they could have secured from the PTO.251
The consequences of claiming broadly in the PTO should
equally apply in the federal courts. If the patentee presents broad
claim construction that, for instance, reads on the prior art or is
unsupported by the written description, he should be penalized by
invalidating that claim.252 This hard lined approach discourages
245

Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 911 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(emphasizing that when proper construction of claims is clear and unambiguous, the
questions of priority and validity must be addressed separately from claim construction).
246
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14, 24 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(internal quotations omitted) (invalidating broadly construed claims because they read on
the prior art); see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d
1430, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (emphasizing that claims are not “to be ‘saved’ from
invalidity by reading extraneous limitations into them”).
247
See Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 911; Karsten, 242 F.3d at 1384; E.I. du Pont, 849
F.2d at 1434.
248
Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
249
See Karsten, 242 F.3d at 1384.
250
See id. This is true only when the claims are amenable to more than one
construction. However, if the claims are amenable to only one possible construction that
would render the claims invalid, courts will not rewrite the claims to sustain their
validity.
251
Apple Computer, 234 F.3d at 24; E.I. du Pont, 849 F.2d at 1434.
252
It is not unusual to penalize a patentee during litigation. In fact, Congress has
enacted a statute that penalizes patentees whose claim was invalidated during litigation
by denying them recovery of legal fees. See 35 U.S.C. § 288.
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patentees from broadening the scope of their claims during
litigation and promotes judicial efficiency in construing disputed
claim terms. Patentees will no longer seek to confuse the court
with overly broad interpretation of claims in fear of getting their
claims invalidated. This approach should only apply to patentee’s
proposed claim construction, and should not be applied
dogmatically by the accused infringer to invalid the patent.253
Protecting the validity of claims during claim construction, not
only encourages a patentee from presenting very broad
interpretation, but also violates the public notice function of
patents and conflicts with the right to a jury trial on invalidity.254 It
violates the public notice function because some information may
not be available to the public until well into the discovery phase of
the case.255 Consequently, it would be unfair to hold the public on
notice of this information. Furthermore, taking validity into
account does conflict with the right to a jury trial on invalidity.256
Because invalidity often requires resolution of factual disputes, it is
the prerogative of the jury and not the judge to resolve these
issues.257 Allowing a trial judge to address these issues during
claim construction would impair the patentee’s right to a jury
trial.258 Hence, considering validity during claim construction is
improper and courts should analyze them separately.

253
See Michael S. Conner & John A Wasleff, Where Do We Go From Here? A Critical
Examination Of Existing Claim Construction Doctrine, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 878, 907 (2004) (noting that “an approach that dogmatically insists that the claim
be construed to the full reach of a word definition, and then immediately invalidates the
patent when it reads on prior art, is [ ] destructive of the presumption of validity . . .” of
the claims).
254
See Br. Of The American Bar Association As Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither
Party at 14–16, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-1269,
03-1286).
255
Id. (noting that “secret” prior art under §§ 102(e) and (g) is not available to the public
to determine the meaning of the claims).
256
Id.
257
Id.
258
Id.
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IV. PHILLIPS: AN ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE TENSION BETWEEN
SPECIFICATION-BASED AND CLAIM-BASED APPROACHES
Because the specification-based approach conflicts with the
claim-based approach, tension between these two methods of claim
construction has slowly brewed over the past decade. Finally, in
Phillips v. AWH Corp., these two methods of claim construction
have come face-to-face in a challenge that would determine their
vitality.259
A. The Trial Court And Federal Circuit Panel Decisions
In Phillips, the patent was directed to vandalism-resistant
building panels used in prison construction.260 At issue was the
meaning of the claim phrase “means disposed inside the shell for
increasing its load bearing capacity comprising steel baffles . . .”261
The patentee, Phillips, argued that the phrase is not a means-plusfunction claim because the word “baffle” recites sufficient
structure.262 To broaden the scope of the claim, the patentee
suggested that the term “baffle” must be construed in accordance
with its ordinary and customary meaning as a “means for
obstructing, impeding, or checking the flow of something.”263 The
accused infringer, AWH Corp., maintained that the specification
limited the scope of “baffle” to a configuration “positioned at an
acute or obtuse angle to wall faces.”264 Specifically, the accused
infringer contended that the written description did not describe a
baffle configuration oriented at 90 degrees to the wall faces, and
therefore, the accused panels fall outside the scope of the claims.265
The district court erroneously interpreted the disputed claim
phrase as a means-plus-function limitation, and relied on the
structures disclosed in the specification for its claim

259

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
dis’d in part, and rem’d, 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
260
Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1209.
261
Id. at 1210 (emphasis added).
262
Id. at 1211.
263
Id. at 1210–11.
264
Id. at 1211.
265
Id.
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construction.266 Based on the undisputed facts of the case, the
lower court granted the accused infringer’s motion for summary
judgment of non-infringement, and the patentee timely appealed to
the Federal Circuit.267
While the majority and the dissenting Federal Circuit judges
agreed that the disputed claim phrase was not a means-plusfunction limitation, they disagreed on the approach for construing
the claim term “baffle.”268 The majority, while citing cases that
applied the claim-based approach,269 mimicked its specificationbased analysis to that of Scimed and Bell Atlantic.270 The majority
explained that “[i]nspection of the patent shows that baffles angled
at other than 90 degrees is the only embodiment disclosed in the
patent; it is the invention.”271 Furthermore, the majority noted that
“[i]t is impossible to derive anything else from the
specification.”272 Because the majority’s claim construction
achieved the same result to that if section 112, paragraph 6 was
invoked, the majority affirmed the lower court’s claim construction
order.273
Dissenting Judge Dyk accused the majority for “attempt[ing] to
work a major and unfortunate change in our recent claim
construction jurisprudence” because they effectively limited the
scope of the claim to the preferred embodiment.274 The judge

266

Id. at 1210.
Id. at 1210–11.
268
Id. at 1212–1219.
269
Id. at 1213 (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366–67
(Fed. Cir. 2002); Comark Communications Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
270
Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2001); Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc. et
al., 262 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
271
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
272
Id. at 1213. Note that the majority’s approach to claim construction is similar to Bell
Atlantic. While the majority opinion suggested that the patentee has used the claim term
throughout the patent specification consistent with only a single meaning, that is a baffle
configuration positioned at an acute or obtuse angle to wall faces, the majority fell short
in concluding that the term was defined “by implication.”
273
Id. at 1214.
274
Id. at 1216. Apparently, Judge Dyk assumed that there is only one line of Federal
Circuit jurisprudence on claim construction. As explained in this article, there are at least
267
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emphasized that the Federal Circuit has “expressly rejected the
contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the
claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that
embodiment.”275
Employing the Suggestion Test to claim
construction, the dissenting judge noted that “ ‘the specification
here does not suggest that [baffles oriented at angles other than 90
degrees] are an essential component of the invention . . . .’”276
Moreover, the judge maintained that the specification touts impact
resistance as one of several objectives, and therefore, the claim
should not be limited to achieve that objective.277 Consequently,
the judge interpreted the term “baffle” consistent with its
dictionary definition.278
Dissatisfied with the panel decision, the patentee filed a
combined petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc.279 In
view of the rising conflict between the specification-based
approach and the claim-based approach, the Federal Circuit
granted the petition to rehear the appeal en banc.280 The Federal
Circuit requested the parties to address seven issues and invited
amicus curiae briefings from bar associations, trade or industry
associations, government entities, and other interested parties.281
After hearing the oral arguments, the Federal Circuit issued its
highly anticipated decision on July 12, 2005.282
B. The En Banc Decision
Nine out of the twelve Federal Circuit judges joined the entire
opinion in favoring the specification-based approach over the

two approaches to claim construction: the specification-based approach and the claimbased approach.
275
Id. at 1217 (quoting Liebel-Flarheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)).
276
Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1217.
277
Id. at 1217–18.
278
Id.
279
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
280
Id.
281
Id. at 1382–84.
282
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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claim-based approach.283 Judge Bryson wrote the majority opinion
for the en banc court.284 Despite the basic agreement for using the
specification-based approach, Judges Lourie and Newman would
have applied the facts differently from the majority.285 Only
Judges Mayer and Newman dissented for the majority’s continued
persistence to give no deference for trial court’s claim construction
rulings.286
The seven issues under en banc review are analyzed below:
Question 1: “Is the public notice function of patent claims
better served by referencing primarily to technical and general
purpose dictionaries and similar sources to interpret a claim term
or by looking primarily to the patentee’s use of the term in the
specification? If both sources are to be consulted, in what order?”
287

The court began its analysis by emphasizing that (1) claim
terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning”;
(2) “the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the
meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in
the art”; and (3) “the person skilled in the art is deemed to read the
claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which
the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent,
including the specification.” 288 The court cited numerous cases for
the proposition that the “best source” for claim construction is the
“patent specification.” 289 The court further noted that the PTO
ascertains claim scope by giving the claim its broadest reasonable
construction ‘in light of the specification as it would be interpreted
by one of ordinary skill in the art.”290 Consequently, the Phillips
court concluded that it is “entirely appropriate for a court, when

283
Id. at 1308–09. Ironically, Judge Dyk, who dissented in the 3 panel decision, also
joined the majority opinion in favoring the specification-based approach to claim
construction..
284
Id.
285
Id. at 1328–30 (Lourie, J. & Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
286
Id. at 1330–35 (Mayer, J. & Newman, J., dissenting).
287
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382–84 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
288
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13.
289
Id. at 1315.
290
Id. at 1316–17.
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conducting claim construction, to rely heavily on the written
description for guidance as to the meaning of the claims.” 291
Although extrinsic evidence, including dictionaries and learned
treatises, are useful in educating the judge on the technology, the
court considered such evidence as “less reliable.”292 The court
explained that extrinsic evidence (1) “by definition is not part of
the patent”; (2) “may not reflect the understanding of a skilled
artisan in the field of the patent”; (3) “can suffer from bias”, such
as in the case of expert report and testimony; and (4) may be an
“unbounded universe” having “some marginal relevance”.293 As a
result, undue reliance on dictionaries, divorced from the intrinsic
record, would undermine the public notice function of patent
claims. 294
In sum, the court attributed greater evidentiary weight to the
specification than dictionaries, but encouraged district courts to use
both types of evidence so that the public notice function of patent
claims would be best served. “The sequence of steps used by the
judge in consulting various sources is not important; what matters
is for the court to attach the appropriate weight to be assigned to
those sources. . .” 295
Question 2: “If dictionaries should serve as the primary source
for claim interpretation, should the specification limit the full
scope of claim language (as defined by the dictionaries) only when
the patentee has acted as his own lexicographer or when the
specification reflects a clear disclaimer of claim scope? If so, what
language in the specification will satisfy those conditions? What
use should be made of general as opposed to technical
dictionaries? How does the concept of ordinary meaning apply if
there are multiple dictionary definitions of the same term? If the
dictionary provides multiple potentially applicable definitions for a
term, is it appropriate to look to the specification to determine
what definition or definitions should apply?” 296
291
292
293
294
295
296

Id. at 1317.
Id. at 1318.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1324.
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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The Phillips court criticized the claim-based approach, adopted
in Texas Digital, because the approach “placed too much reliance
on extrinsic sources such as dictionaries . . . and too little on
intrinsic sources, in particular the specification and prosecution
history.”297 It allowed courts to consult the specification only after
determining a claim term’s ordinary meaning based on a dictionary
definition.298 Typically, the specification was used to (1) exclude
one of the meanings determined from the dictionary; (2) determine
if the patentee has disavowed any claim scope; or (3) determine if
the patentee acted as his or her own lexicographer. 299
The court emphasized that the claim-based approach
“improperly restricts the role of the specification in claim
construction” and allows an “unduly expansive” interpretation of
claims beyond what the inventor secured from the PTO.300 The
court noted that both general and technical dictionaries provide
“expansive array of definitions,” but there is no assurance that
these dictionaries used the term in the same manner as the patentee
have in the specification.301 If a district court begins its analysis
with a “broad dictionary definition in every case and fails to fully
appreciate how the specification implicitly limits that definition,
the error will systematically cause the construction of the claim to
be unduly expansive.”302 Accordingly, the Phillips court explained
that this “risk of systematic overbreadth is greatly reduced if the
court instead focuses at the outset on how the patentee used the
claim term in the claims, specification, and prosecution history,
rather than starting with a broad definition and whittling it
down.”303
Question 3: “If the primary source for claim construction
should be the specification, what use should be made of
dictionaries? Should the range of the ordinary meaning of claim
language be limited to the scope of the invention disclosed in the
297
298
299
300
301
302
303

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1321.
Id..
Id.
Id.
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specification, for example, when only a single embodiment is
disclosed and no other indications of breadth are disclosed?” 304
The Phillips court attributed a secondary role to dictionaries,
outweighed by the specification and the prosecution history. It
rejected the claim-based approach, but failed to adequately address
the underlying concern of Texas Digita—to avoid importing
limitations from the specification into the claims.305 “[T]here is
sometimes a fine line between reading a claim in light of the
specification, and reading a limitation into the claim from the
specification.”306 The court explained that this line “can be
discerned with reasonable certainty and predictability if the court’s
focus remains on understanding how a person of ordinary skill in
the art would understand the claim terms.”307
Unfortunately, the court’s explanation on this key issue
provides neither “clarity” nor “predictability.” If we are to focus
on how a person skilled in the art would understand the claim
terms, we would probably need extrinsic evidence, such as expert
testimony. Ironically, expert testimony has a subordinate role in
claim construction because it is readily viewed as biased
opinion.308 So, how can we rely on subordinate evidence to
determine the role of the specification, the primary evidence for
claim construction?
The Phillips en banc court also warned against limiting claims
to specific embodiments in the specification, even if the patent
described only a single embodiment.309 The court maintained that
reading the specification, with the understanding that its specific
purpose is to teach, enable, and provide the best mode for
practicing the invention, would in most instances clarify whether
the patentee merely provided some examples or intended to limit
the claims to the embodiments.310 The court acknowledged that in
304

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
306
Id. (citing Comark Comms., Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186–87 (Fed. Cir.
1998)).
307
Id. at 1323.
308
Id. at 1318.
309
Id. at 1323 (citing Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l, Inc. v. International Trade Comm’n, 383
F.3d 1352, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
310
Id. at 1323.
305
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some instances “it will be hard to determine whether a person of
skill in the art would understand the embodiments to define the
outer limits of the claim term or merely to be exemplary in
nature.”311 Nevertheless, the court refrained from devising a
“magic formula or catechism for conducting claim construction”
and preferred to address this issue in the context of a specific
patent.312
This decision leaves the door open for inconsistent judicial
claim interpretation, as illustrated by how Judges Lourie and
Newman construed the term “baffle” different from the
majority.313 The majority emphasized that the specification does
not require all the advantages of the claim term to be
accomplished; rather, any one advantage would suffice.314
Consequently, the term “baffle” should not be limited to acute or
obtuse angles, but can also be oriented at a right angle.315
Disagreeing with the majority’s claim construction, Judges Lourie
and Newman pointed out that the specification does not contain
any disclosures of baffles with right angles, and so must be limited
to acute or obtuse angles.316 This demonstrates that even when the
Federal Circuit agrees on using a unified claim construction
approach, the outcome of the case is still dependent on the judge’s
personal interpretation of claims.
Question 4: “Instead of viewing the claim construction
methodologies in the majority and dissent of the now-vacated
panel decision as alternative, conflicting approaches, should the
two approaches be treated as complementary methodologies such
that there is a dual restriction on claim scope, and a patentee must
satisfy both limiting methodologies in order to establish the claim
coverage it seeks?” 317
The Phillips court did not consider the two approaches
complementary; instead, it favored the specification-based
311
312
313
314
315
316
317

Id.
Id. at 1324.
Id. at 1329 (Lourie, J. & Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id. at 1326–27.
Id. at 1327.
Id. at 1329–30 (Lourie, J. & Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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approach over the claim-based approach.318 Like Vitronics, the
court permitted the use of dictionaries and treatises, only to the
extent that they do not “contradict claim meaning that is
unambiguous in light of the intrinsic evidence.” 319 It did not
provide a “rigid algorithm for claim construction.”320 Instead, the
court encouraged district court judges to consider all evidence, in
any sequence, and attribute more evidentiary weight to intrinsic
evidence.321
Question 5: “When, if ever, should claim language be narrowly
construed for the sole purpose of avoiding invalidity under, e.g., 35
U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 and 112?” 322
The Federal Circuit continued its controversial practice of
narrowly construing claims to preserve their validity.323 While the
court did not endorse a validity analysis as a regular component of
claim construction, it limited such analysis only when “the court
concludes, after applying all the available tools of claim
construction, that the claim is still ambiguous.”324 Since the court
considered the term “baffle” as unambiguous, it refused to apply
the “doctrine of construing claims to preserve their validity.”325
Although the Phillips court permitted the commingling of
validity analysis with claim construction, it misapplied the
doctrine.326 The doctrine requires that “[c]laims amenable to more
than one construction should, when it is reasonably possible to do
so, be construed to preserve their validity.”327 However, if after
employing all the tools to claim construction, the claim is
ambiguous or rendered invalid, the Federal Circuit should not
“save” the claim from invalidity by reading extraneous limitations
318

See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1325–27 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
Id. at 1324; see Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs. Inc., 319 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
320
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324.
321
Id. (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1996)).
322
Id. at 1382.
323
Id. at 1327–28.
324
Id. at 1327 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 911 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)).
325
Id. at 1327–28.
326
See id.
327
Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
319
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into it.328 Hence, the court should invoke the doctrine when a
claim term is susceptible to more than one meaning, and not if the
term is ambiguous, as the Phillips court has suggested.329
Moreover, if the claim term is ambiguous, the court should refrain
from “saving” the term from invalidity, rather than indulge in an
effort to preserve its validity.
Question 6: “What role should prosecution history and expert
testimony by one of ordinary skill in the art play in determining the
meaning of the disputed claim terms?”330
The prosecution history is part of the intrinsic record; therefore,
it should be considered in determining the meaning of a disputed
claim term, and must be attributed more evidentiary weight than
any extrinsic evidence.331 It contains a “complete record of the
proceeding before the PTO,” including any explanations made by
the patentee to obtain the patent.332 However, “it often lacks the
clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim
construction purposes” because it only “represents an ongoing
negotiation” between the patent applicant and the PTO.333
Nevertheless, the prosecution history can be useful in claim
construction by indicating “how the inventor understood the
invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the
course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it
would otherwise be.”334
Extrinsic evidence in the form of expert testimony is
considered “less significant” and “less reliable” than the intrinsic
evidence.335 This is because expert testimony is “generated at the
time of and for the purpose of litigation and thus can suffer from
bias that is not present in intrinsic evidence.”336 However, it can
have a constructive role in claim construction by (1) educating the
court on the relevant technology; (2) explaining how the invention
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336

See Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 911; Karsten, 242 F.3d at 1384.
See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382–84 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317.
Id. (citing Autogiro Co of America v. U.S., 384 F.2d 391, 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1317–19.
Id. at 1318.
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works; (3) ensuring the court’s understanding of the technology is
consistent with that of a person of ordinary skill in the art; and (4)
establishing a particular term’s special meaning in the pertinent
field.337 Hence, expert testimony is useful, but must be considered
in the context of and attributed less evidentiary weight than the
intrinsic record.338
Question 7: “Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 . . . (1996),
and our en banc decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies,
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed.Cir.1998), is it appropriate for this court
to accord any deference to any aspect of trial court claim
construction rulings? If so, on what aspects, in what
circumstances, and to what extent?”339
The Phillips court decided not to change the de novo review of
a trial court’s claim construction ruling.340 While many were
hoping that the Federal Circuit would give some deference to a
trial court’s claim construction, the en banc court declined to
address this issue in the present case.341 This decision drew
criticism from Judges Mayer and Newman.342 They were
disappointed that the majority did not say anything new, “but
merely restate what has become the practice over the last ten years
– that [the Federal Circuit] will decide cases according to whatever
mode or method results in the outcome [it] desire[s].”343 Using
“dictionaries first, dictionaries second, never dictionaries, etc., etc,
etc.” are among the many alternative modes that the Federal
Circuit has employed.344 The dissenting judges emphasized that
“there can be no workable standards by which this court will
interpret claims so long as we are blind to the factual component of
the task.”345 Since the Federal Circuit has maintained status quo,
this debate on the standard of review will continue unresolved.
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345

Id. 1318–19.
Id. at 1317.
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
Id. at 1328.
See id. at 1330–35 (Mayer, J. & Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1330.
Id.
Id. at 1331.
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CONCLUSION
Embarking on a quest to provide a unified claim construction
approach, the Phillips en banc case could undoubtedly have had a
greater impact on the legal and business professions. This Note
presented the ideological underpinnings of the two approaches to
claim construction, and examined their advantages and
disadvantages. The Phillips court may have relieved the tension
between the two approaches by choosing the specification-based
approach over the claim-based approach, but it failed to adequately
address the disadvantage of using the specification-based
approach. The court did not explain how one can distinguish
between “reading limitations from the specification into the
claim”346 and “interpreting patent claims [in light] of the
specification.”347 Accordingly, the role of the specification
remains obscure. While it is unlikely that this case will be the last
word on claim construction, it is hoped that this Note will
contribute some constructive ideas to the court’s future
examination of its claim construction methodology.

346
347

Id. at 1323.
Id. at 1329.

